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MODELING THE CONGRESSIONAL END-RUN
CONSTRAINT
Luke M. Milligan *
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century law professors and political scientists have
shared a commitment to the study of how judges decide cases.'
Today the subject of judicial decisionmaking continues to hold the
focus of some of the most influential scholars in law schools and
political science departments.2
Despite their common point of study, legal scholars and political scientists have traditionally held deep suspicions about the
other's models, data, and ideas.3 Their mutual distrust is a func* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. The author is
grateful for comments received at the Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum at Emory
University School of Law and the Faculty Workshop Series at Florida State University
College of Law.
1. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 111 (2010); Nancy Maveety, The Study of JudicialBehavior
and the Discipline of PoliticalScience, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 5 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); NEAL
DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation,89 MINN. L. REV. 848

(2005); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach:PostBehavioralistApproaches to
Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601 (2000).
3. See, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE
COLLEGIAL GAME 151 (2000) ("[Flor decades these two divergent orientations have talked
past each other rather than recognize the possible connections between their research
agendas."); Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging,47 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 783, 783 (2003) ("It has been in only the last few years that law professors have shown
much interest in political science approaches to judging. . . ."); Thomas M. Keck, Party

Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511, 512 (2007)

("[It

[is] ...

863

almost a rite of passage for political
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tion of contending assumptions about judicial values and goals.
Within political science, scholars of "judicial politics" have tended
to assume that judges use their office to maximize the implementation of a broad platform of individual policy preferences.4 This
assumption has been resisted, and in most cases flatly rejected,
by the constitutional theorists of the legal academy. Generally
speaking, the constitutional theorists have assumed that judges,
if policy-driven at all, use their office to promote only those "high"
policies concerning the structure, limits, and role of government.'

scientists who study the Court to complain that law professors ignore their work and that
the quality of legal scholarship has suffered as a result."). This distrust revealed itself
pronouncedly in the rise of attitudinalism in political science. See Luke M. Milligan, Con-

gressionalEnd-Run: The Ignored Constrainton Judicial Review, 45 GA. L. REV. 211, 22124 (2010). But see Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262
(2006) ("[L]egal scholars now are pursuing the same sort of empirical inquiries as positive
scholars, creating exciting opportunities for true interdisciplinary collaboration."); Gregory

C. Sisk, The QuantitativeMoment and the Qualitative Opportunity:Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 876 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS,
DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)) (discussing the "Quantitative
Moment" in legal academia).
4. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 2, at 23 & n.a (discussing how "most justices, in most cases, pursue policy; that is, they want to move the substantive content of
law as close as possible to their preferred position" and citing as an example "particular
preferences about specific policy questions, such as the drinking age for alcoholic beverages"); J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 33 (2004) (characterizing the general approach of judicial politics scholars as "assum[ing] that justices on the Supreme Court compete with members of Congress over a prioripolicy preferences"); Frank B. Cross, What Do
Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 203 (2008) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 2) ("The
sense of the political-science discipline is generally that the Supreme Court Justices
,should be viewed as promoters of their personal policy preferences rather than as interpreters of law."' (quoting Howard Gillman, What's Law Got To Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal Model" of JudicialDecisionMaking, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 465,
466 (2001))); Adrian Vermeule, ConnectingPositive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 387, 397 n.25 (2008) ("More commonly, political scientists model judges as ...
interested solely in advancing their views of good policy, as opposed to good constitutional
law."). Scholars have used different terms to characterize this subfield of political science.
See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 111 (discussing the shift from "political jurisprudence" to
"judicial politics").
5. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1409 (2001) ("Although few legal academics these days are shocked to
learn that Justices' decisions are 'political' in the sense that they promote 'high politics'larger political principles and ideological goals-they were quite disturbed by the possibility that Justices would use the power of judicial review in so prominent a case to promote
the interests of a particular political party . . . ."); see also MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 3,
at 150 ("[J]udicial behavioralists and legal scholars each subscribe to a different paradigm.
Whereas the former have tended to argue that justices' behavior stems from their personal
policy preferences, the latter question any approach that ignores the role of law."); Barry
Friedman, The Politicsof JudicialReview, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 258 (2005) ("Constitutional
theory is all about cabining law from politics, both to ensure that judges are constrained
by law (and thus do not simply vote their own values) and to prevent politics from influen-
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This dissonance of assumptions, however, need not impede the
realization of interdisciplinary synergies. Many insights relating
to judicial decisionmaking can be unhinged from their authors'
assumptions about judicial values and, once freed, exported into
studies operating on different assumptions.6 In a recent work I
identified one of these untended synergies.7 Ignored by political
scientists, the "congressional end-run" imposes a unique constraint on the exercise of judicial review by Justices assumed in
the judicial politics literature.8
The prevailing judicial politics literature holds that there are
but two types of congressional constraints on judicial review.
First, "curbs" occur when Congress acts to formally limit the
Court's authority.9 Second, "overrides" occur when Congress substitutes its preferred constitutional interpretation for that of the
Court. 0 This two-constraint paradigm of judicial politics is nonetheless far from complete. Recent findings from constitutional
theory (most notably the inventory of mitigating legislative responses cited by Professors Devins, Stuntz, and Farber)," when
freed from their authors' assumptions about judicial values, reveal a third type of congressional constraint that has been overlooked by judicial politics scholars. 2 This third constraint, termed
the "end-run," occurs when Congress mitigates the costs of adverse judicial review by neither limiting the Court's authority nor
substituting its constitutional interpretation for that of the Court,
but by a different decision which cannot, as a practical if not legal
matter, be invalidated by the Court." Examples include congres-

cing law.").

6. See generally Mitu Gulati et al., EvaluatingJudges and JudicialInstitutions:Reorienting the Perspective (Working Paper, Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1561662 (calling on judicial politics scholars to "read[ ]
theorists and judges closely and design[] studies specifically to test their ideas or address
their concerns").
7. Milligan, supra note 3, at 213-215 (identifying the "congressional end-run").
8. Id.
9. Id. at 233-36 (discussing the manner in which curbing constrains judicial review).
10. Id. at 236-41 (discussing the manner in which an override constrains judicial review).
11. Id. at 245-58 (discussing DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 2; Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Constitutionalism in a System of Judicial Supremacy, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 431 (Richard W.

Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between

Criminal Procedureand CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997)).
12.
13.

Milligan, supranote 3, at 258-63.
Id. at 260.
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sional decisions to adjust appropriations, amend "contingent"
rules, reorient the constitutional bases for invalidated legislation
in alternate clauses, or modify grants of authority to the executive branch.1
To illustrate the constraining role of congressional end-runs,
assume a strategic Justice who seeks to use his position to advance a broad platform of individual policy preferences. Further
assume (1) that the Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether procedural due process requires that welfare recipients
be provided with counsel and a hearing before the termination of
benefits, and (2) that our Justice would prefer, as a matter of attitude or ideology, to rule for the welfare recipients. Congress (and
perhaps state legislatures) can nonetheless constrain our Justice
from voting for his sincere preference by suggesting that it will
respond to any new constitutional "tax" on welfare benefits by
producing less welfare (i.e., reducing or altogether eliminating related welfare programs). A congressional adjustment of appropriations, for the purpose of mitigating the costs of complying with
an adverse procedural due process ruling, constitutes an end-run.
At some point the expected costs of this end-run (from the Justice's perspective) will become high enough to cause the Justice to
deviate from his preferred decision-point to one more aligned with
congressional preferences.' 5 This simple hypothetical illustrates
how Congress can successfully constrain an exercise of judicial
review without resorting to a curb (formally limiting the Court's
authority) or an override (substituting its preferred interpretation for that of the Court).
Building on my previous work,16 this article provides a more
formal demonstration of the unique constraining effect of the endrun. It proceeds in two parts. Part II reviews the congressional
end-run, describing its origins in constitutional theory studies,
and explaining that it has been overlooked by judicial politics
scholars. Part III, the heart of the article, incorporates the endrun into a formal theoretical model of judicial decisionmaking.
This revised model reveals that the prevailing strategic models of
judicial politics (which have worked within the two-constraint pa-

14.
15.
16.
sional

Id. at 258-59.
See infra Part IID.
See Milligan, supra note 3, at 258-63 (identifying the phenomenon of the congresend-run).
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radigm) have systematically underestimated the degree to which
their assumed Justices are constrained by Congress. The article
concludes by calling on judicial politics scholars to amend their
formal models and redesign their empirical studies to account for
the constraining role of the congressional end-run.
II. CONSTRAINTS ON DECISIONMAKING

Overlooked by political scientists, the end-run is the third type
of congressional constraint on the exercise of judicial review by
Justices assumed in the judicial politics literature. The following
paragraphs describe the concept of constraints in the judicial politics literature, explain how it can be enhanced by recent studies
in constitutional theory, define the "congressional end-run," and
survey Supreme Court case law for evidence that Justices are
aware of end-runs.
A. Theoretical Backdrop:Attitudinalism and the StrategicModel
The field of judicial politics rests on an attitudinal-strategic divide. The attitudinal wing claims that Justices use their office to
advance a broad platform of policy preferences and that Justices
vote their "sincere" preferences. 7 The strategic wing adopts the
first attitudinal claim (that Justices seek to implement a broad
policy platform) but challenges the claim that Justices vote sincerely."' The strategic model argues the Justices realize constraints on their ability to implement policy (most notably those

17. By "broad" I mean to say not only those "high" policy preferences regarding the
structure and role of government, but also "particular preferences about specific policy
questions," which would extend to more pedestrian and local matters "such as the drinking age for alcoholic beverages." EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 2, at 23 n.a. See generally
PICKERILL, supra note 4, at 33 (observing that the general approach in judicial politics
models "assumes that justices on the Supreme Court compete with members of Congress
over a priori policy preferences"); Cross, supra note 4, at 203 ("The sense of the politicalscience discipline is generally that the Supreme Court Justices 'should be viewed as promoters of their personal policy preferences rather than as interpreters of law."' (quoting

Howard Gillman, What's Law Got To Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Model" Of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001))). For a discussion of why Justices vote sincerely, see, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court

Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAING 237, 240 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
18. Brian R. Sala & James F. Spriggs, II, Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and
the Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RES. Q. 197, 199 (2004) ('The [Separation of Powers]
Game simply adds a legislative bargaining subgame to the Attitudinalist Game." (emphasis omitted)).
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imposed by Congress, the Executive, and interpreting courts),
and modify their decisionmaking accordingly.9 As Professor
Baum observed, "[j]udges who vote strategically take into account
the effects of their choices on collective results when they vote on
outcomes and write or support opinions.... Because of this motivation, the positions they take may differ from the positions that
they most prefer."2 0 In effect, strategic scholars claim that institutions "mediate between preferences and outcomes by affecting the
justices' beliefs about the consequences of their actions."21 And so
the strategic model (alternatively referred to as the separation-ofpowers ("SOP') model) can be understood as comprising three
core tenets. First, Justices seek to use their office to implement a
broad platform of policy preferences.22 Second, Justices realize
their ability to implement policy is constrained.23 Lastly, Justices
are prepared to "game" their judicial votes accordingly. 24 The following section elaborates on the state of the literature on the
strategic model.
B. JudicialPolitics
A substantial share of the SOP literature has centered on how
Congress impacts judicial decisionmaking.25 While the literature's
terminology has, over the decades, been neither uniform nor precise, my research reveals that the congressional constraints on
judicial review identified by judicial politics scholars can be classified as either "curbs" or "overrides."26

19. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 2, at 10 ("[A strategic] account [of judicial
decisions] rests on a few simple propositions: justices may be primarily seekers of legal
policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based on their own ideological attitudes. Rather, justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to
achieve goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices
they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act."); Whittington,
supra note 2, at 611 (stating that judges "may need to act strategically, in the sense of understanding and anticipating the likely responses of others to the judge's own actions"
(emphasis omitted)).
20. BAUM, supranote 2, at 90.
21. MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 14.
22. Milligan, supra note 3, at 224.
23. Id. at 224-25.
24. Id. at 225-26.
25. Id. at 229-42.
26. Professor Stumpf is generally credited as having founded the two-constraint paradigm. See Harry P. Stumpf, CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377, 382 (1965) (designating these as "two basic
types of legislative responses"); see also Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court
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Curbs are formal legislative enactments that limit the power or
independence of the Court.27 Along these lines, Gerald Rosenberg
helpfully identified "ten types of proposals that have been made
to limit the power of the Court or demonstrate congressional displeasure,"2 including:
(1) using the Senate's confirmation power to select certain types of
judges; (2) enacting constitutional amendments to ... change Court
structure or procedure; (3) impeachment; (4) withdrawing Court jurisdiction over certain subjects; (5) altering the selection and removal process; (6) requiring extraordinary majorities for declarations of
unconstitutionality; (7) allowing appeal from the Supreme Court to a
more "representative" tribunal; (8) removing the power of judicial
review; (9) slashing the budget; (10) altering the size of the Court.2 9

Professor Rosenberg's list has been supplemented over the years.
More recently recognized curbs include decisions to freeze judicial
salaries,"o lower staff funding,31 require circuit duty,32 collect information about disfavored judges," and "specify[ ] the number of
votes needed to exercise the power of judicial review."4
Curbs are not the only congressional constraint emphasized by
judicial politics scholars. Congress also has the power to influence
judicial review by threat of an "override." An override occurs
when "Congress substitute[s] its own constitutional interpretation for that of the Court."3 Overrides are generally thought to
come in two forms. Congress can initiate a constitutional
amendment," or alternatively, disregard, by act or omission, the
Curbing,and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2009). For a more elaborate
discussion on this point, see Milligan, supra note 3, at 232 n.82.
27. Milligan, supra note 3, at 233; Stumpf, supranote 26, at 382.
28. Gerald N. Rosenberg, JudicialIndependence and the Reality of PoliticalPower, 54
REV. POL. 369, 376 (1992).
29. Id. at 377 (emphasis omitted).
30. Congress cannot lower judicial salaries, but it can freeze them to let inflation ac-

complish the same end. See Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic
Environment of JudicialReview, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 446, 449 (2003).
31. Id.

32.

Id.

33. In recent years, Congress has investigated and threatened to publish the names of
judges who depart downward from the sentencing guidelines. See Editorial, Blacklisting
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at WK10.
34. Whittington, supra note 30, at 449.
35. PICKERILL, supra note 4, at 32; see also Milligan, supra note 3, at 236. The override has been alternatively referred to as "decision reversal." See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note

26, at 382.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. V; PICKERILL, supra note 4, at 7-48 (describing Congress's
passage and the states' ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in response to the
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Court's interpretationY This second type of override calls to mind
Alexander Hamilton's observation that the judiciary "may truly
be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment."38
For an example of an override one might recall Congress's regular
use of the legislative veto after the Court's ruling in INS v. Chadha.39
As it stands the prevailing SOP studies on Congress's role in
judicial review are inconclusive.40 On the one hand, the literature
strongly suggests that Justices do in fact deviate from their facial
policy preferences in some base percentage of cases.4 1 Yet on the
other hand, leading judicial politics scholars remain skeptical
Court's invalidation of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970)).
37. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 2, at 144 ("[G]overnment actors can refuse, implicitly or explicitly, to implement particular constitutional decisions, thereby decreasing
the Court's ability to create efficacious policy."); J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme
Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11
(1968) ("Indeed, if the Court is too far out of touch with the people, the Congress and the
executive can annul its directives simply by refusing to execute them. . . .").
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003);
see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 21 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a decision too far out of the political mainstream
"may amount to little more than 'a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's
will' (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941))).
39. See PICKERILL, supra note 4, at 149 ("Congress appears to have ignored the
Court's holding [in Chadha] in a number of statutes."); Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto:
Invalidated,It Survives, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 288 (1993) ("Congress continued to
add legislative vetoes to bills and Presidents ... continued to sign them into law. From the
date of the Court's decision in Chadha to the end of the 102nd Congress . . . Congress
enacted more than two hundred new legislative vetoes. Most of these require the executive
branch to obtain the approval of [a] specified committee[]. . . ."). For discussion of additional congressional attempts to override judicial review, see Louis Fisher, Congressional
Checks on the Judiciary, in CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR
LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN LAWMAKING 21, 28-29 (Colton C. Campbell & John F.
Stack Jr. eds., 2001) (discussing bills introduced following Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1856) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)), and Stumpf, supra
note 26, at 378-81 (analyzing congressional legislation in the wake of Baker v. Carr,369
U.S. 186 (1962)).
40. See Milligan, supra note 3, at 241-42.
41. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 112 ("[R]ecent quantitative studies of judging ...
comport far more closely with what judges say about judging than with the positions taken
by judicial politics scholars."); Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting
Project: Legal and PoliticalScience Approaches to PredictingSupreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150 (2004) (comparing the prediction accuracy rates of legal experts (59.1%) with that of a statistical model (75%)); Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial
Politics, the Rule of Law and the Future of an Ermine Myth 21 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of
Law-Bloomington, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 165, Apr.
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1598454 (summarizing quantitative studies of
the Supreme Court as generally affirming the attitudinal model but recognizing "important nuances").
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about the constraining role of curbs and overrides.42 While findings of deviation from facial policy preferences can be a function
of any number of factors (miscoding of judicial preferences, judicial fidelity to precedent, judicial concern for public consensus,
etc.), it is certainly possible that part of this deviation can be attributed to congressional constraints other than curbs or overrides.
C. ConstitutionalTheory
Gazing beyond the confines of the judicial politics literature to
recent developments in constitutional theory, one can identify a
third, heretofore ignored, congressional constraint on the exercise
of judicial review by the Justices assumed in judicial politics studies. Over the past fifteen years, several constitutional theorists
have inventoried the various methods by which legislatures respond to unwelcomed judicial review. Louis Fisher and Neal Devins have identified the phenomenon of congressional "signals,"43
William Stuntz has discussed the role of "substantive criminal
law" on constitutional criminal procedure,44 and Daniel Farber
has analyzed the "mitigating mechanisms" available to Congress. 5 Of the legislative responses cited in these studies, six are
of particular relevance to the judicial politics scholar. These are
legislative decisions to modify:
(1) appropriations,46
(2) contingent laws4 7

42. See MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 4 ("[W]e know little about how frequently
or under what conditions justices are prone to play this strategic game."); Sala & Spriggs,
supra note 18, at 204-05 (stating that "no ... evidence has yet to emerge for the separation of powers game"); id. at 197 ("[C]onvincing empirical support for a checks-andbalances constraint on justices' choices has been . .. elusive, however."); Jeffrey A. Segal,

Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 28, 35 (1997) ("[Wlhile ardent adherents argue that the separation-of-powers
model has been theoretically and empirically verified . . . the evidence is far from convincing.").
43. See NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE (1996) (analyzing interaction between the
Court, elected government, and the American people); DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 2, at
42 ("Once the Supreme Court decides a case, Congress may use a wide variety of powers to
signal its approval or disapproval."). Examples of signals include funding decisions and
legislation that mitigates the policy costs of particular decisions.
44. See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 4.
45. See Farber, supra note 11, at 435-41.

46.

See Stuntz, supranote 11, at 4.
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(3) the constitutional bases for legislation, 4
(4) grants of executive authority, 4
(5) legislative rights,o and
(6) legislation concerning state regulation of commerce.5'
The studies which identified these legislative responses did not,
however, suggest they were "constraints" on judicial decisionmaking. The authors of such studies, after all, assumed that Justices
are either: (1) not strategic, or (2) strategic only under those exceptional circumstances when necessary to preserve their interpretive primacy (i.e., their ability to form policy through future
exercises of judicial review).52 Yet when one replaces the authors'
underlying assumptions about judicial values with those of judicial politics scholars, these six legislative responses can be neatly
reframed as "constraints" on judicial review.53 Interestingly, these
constraints are neither curbs (as they do not formally limit the
Court's authority) nor overrides (as they do not substitute the legislature's interpretation for that of the Court). The following paragraphs describe the constraining effect of these legislative responses.
D. The End-Run Constraint
Recent studies in constitutional theory hint at congressional
constraints on judicial review falling outside of the two-constraint
paradigm of judicial politics.14 For the sake of clarity these constraints can be bundled into a type of constraint termed the "end47. See Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal
Laws and the Applicability of Federal ConstitutionalRights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143
(2009) (discussing contingent rules); Stuntz, supranote 12, at 7.
48. See Farber,supra note 11, at 440.
49. See id. at 438 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
50. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARv. L. REV. 26, 32 (1994); Farber, supra note 11, at 435.
51. See Farber, supra note 11, at 440-41; Richard A. Paschal, CongressionalPower to
Change ConstitutionalLaw: Three Lacunae, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1053, 1056-57 (2009) (discussing Congress's supremacy in constitutional issues involving sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment and intergovernmental tax immunity for both state and federal
governments).
52. See Milligan, supranote 3, at 259.
53. See id. at 259-60 (describing how a Justice looking to maximize the implementation of a broad policy platform will be constrained by possible expected congressional responses).
54. See id. at 245-58.
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run." The congressional end-run has been defined as follows:
Congress mitigates the policy costs of adverse judicial review
through neither formal limits on the Court's autonomy nor substitution of its constitutional interpretation for that of the Court, but
through a different decision which cannot, as a practical if not legal
matter, be invalidated by the Court."

The definition of the congressional end-run is limited in two important ways. The first is by the term "different decision." This
term excludes congressional decisions to curb or override. The
second limitation is that end-runs must be insulated, as a practical if not legal matter, from being invalidated. 6 The concept of
"insulation" excludes congressional decisions to (1) defiantly reenact invalidated legislation, or (2) enact legislation that purports
to simply correct the precise constitutional defects identified by
the Court."' After all, neither type of congressional response is insulated from a second round of adverse judicial review.
The six legislative responses in subpart C can be classified as
"end-runs." First, each mitigates the costs of adverse judicial review. Second, none formally limits the authority of the Court nor
substitutes Congress's interpretation for that of the Court. Third,
each is generally insulated from judicial review. Typical congres-

55.

Id. at 260.

56. It is worth emphasizing that "insulated" does not mean "immune." By "insulated,"
I simply mean that adverse judicial review will be extraordinarily expensive for the Court.
For example, consider a congressional decision to repeal a particular welfare program. As
stated above, such a decision is generally insulated from being invalidated. But by this I
do not necessarily mean that the Court cannot invalidate the decision. Rather, I mean that
the Court will not invalidate the decision. After all, such flagrant disregard for text,
precedent, and legal norms would almost certainly invite a congressional override or curb.
The point here is that by "insulated" I mean to suggest a practical-if not necessarily legal-freedom from adverse judicial review. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF
JUDICIAL STRATEGY 31 (1964) ("[E]ven a judge who had little respect for technical lawcourt rules would find it prudent to assume such respect before some of the popular, bureaucratic, or political checks were applied against his tribunal.").
57.

See WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE

AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 153 (1962) (describing congressional attempts to verify the

Court's reaction to post-Jencks legislation); id. at 134 (quoting S. REP. NO. 981, reprinted
in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1861, 1862) (stating that the bill "is not designed to nullify, or to
curb, or to limit the decision of the Supreme Court . .. [but] reaffirms the decision");
GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 4-5 (2005) (de-

scribing the Bundestag's reaction to the German Federal Constitutional Court's campaign
finance decisions); see also United States v. Palermo, 258 F.2d 397, 400 & n.6 (2d Cir.
1958) (agreeing with committee report and upholding Jencks legislation). It is not unusual
for the Court to forecast the constitutionality of potential congressional modifications. See
generally Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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sional decisions to modify appropriations, grants of authority to
the executive branch, or legislation concerning state regulation of
commerce run virtually no risk of being invalidated by the
Court.** And, depending on the state of precedent at a given moment, Congress retains broad discretion to modify, without concern of adverse judicial review, certain contingent laws, legislative rights, or the constitutional bases for invalidated legislation.
It is important to explain briefly how judicial review can trigger a congressional end-run. Take a situation where the Court is
faced with a decision whether to extend the constitutional exclusionary rule to arrests that violate a statutory limit on arrest
power (such as a jurisdictional limit) but nonetheless meet the
constitutional requirement that arrests be based on probable
cause that a crime was committed."9 If the Court decides to side
with the defendant, it will effectively impose a new "exclusionary
tax" on state laws limiting arrest powers.6 0 Such a tax would eliminate one of the "moderate" blocs of the legislature (i.e., those legislators who support limits on arrest powers but are unwilling to
punish excesses with an exclusionary sanction).61 The exclusionary tax, when imposed by the Court, necessarily flushes the legislative moderates out into either a more liberal or conservative
bloc.62 Should a sufficient number of these legislative moderates
defect to a more conservative bloc, then the related laws saddled
with an exclusionary tax will be repealed.6 3
End-runs undoubtedly constrain the exercise of judicial review
by the strategic Justices assumed in the judicial politics literature (i.e., Justices looking to maximize the implementation of
broad policy platforms). Such Justices will incorporate the expected costs of adverse end-runs into their voting calculus on
58. See ROSENBERG, supranote 38, at 18 (stating that judges are "not in a particularly
powerful position to successfully order the other branches to expend additional funds");
Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673, 676 (1969) ("[The real problem is
one of inadequate resources, which the courts are helpless to remedy .... ). But see Griffin
v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (finding that "the perpetuation of racial segregation by closing public schools and operating only segregated schools supported directly
or indirectly by state or county funds" violated the Equal Protection Clause).
59. This was the issue before the Court in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). In
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court distinguished "illegal" arrests from
"unconstitutional" arrests.
60. See Milligan, supra note 3, at 264.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
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judicial review.64 And at some point the expected costs of end-runs
become sufficiently high to cause these Justices to deviate from
their ideological vote to one more aligned with congressional preferences.6 Returning to the illustration involving the exclusionary
tax, a strategic Justice looking to maximize the implementation
of a liberal public policy agenda will, at some point, compromise
his preferred decision-point (which would have expanded the exclusionary rule) in order to avoid triggering a legislative repeal of
underlying arrest regulations. This illustrates how Congress can
effectively constrain the exercise of judicial review-not through
a curb or override-but through a congressional end-run.
Judicial awareness of end-runs is, of course, a necessary condition to any claim that end-runs constrain judicial decisionmaking.
Judicial anticipation of end-runs has yet to be studied empirically, but a brief glance back through Supreme Court case law
makes clear that Justices understand the legislative power to
end-run. This awareness has manifested itself most frequently in
warnings about forcing legislatures into "all-or-nothing" dilemmas. 66 While examples are plentiful, Justice Black's dissent in
Goldberg v. Kelly is certainly worth a mention here:
Since this process will usually entail a delay of several years, the inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed burden will be that
the government will not put a claimant on the rolls initially until it
has made an exhaustive investigation to determine his eligibility.
While this Court will perhaps have insured that no needy person will
be taken off the rolls without a full "due process" proceeding, it will
also have insured that many will never get on the rolls, or at least
that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine initial eligibility."

64. In a previous article I explained that end-runs constrain judicial review as follows:
"A Level-1 Justice will compromise his preferred vote on judicial review to avoid triggering
an end-run he perceives to be sufficiently disruptive of his broad policy platform." Id. at
260.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 266-69. Looking beyond the case law one finds similar concerns raised by
Justices in commentary. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977) ("If the Supreme Court
insists on limiting the content of due process to the rights created by state law, state
courts can breathe new life into the federal due process clause by interpreting their common law, statutes and constitutions to guarantee a 'property' and 'liberty' that even the
federal courts must protect.").
67. 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution does
not ensure process rights for the withdrawal of elective welfare benefits).
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For a more recent example, one might consider the observations
of Justice Scalia, writing for eight Justices in Virginia v. Moore:
Moore would allow Virginia to accord enhanced protection against
arrest only on pain of accompanying that protection with federal remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, which often include the
exclusionary rule. States unwilling to lose control over the remedy
would have to abandon restrictions on arrest altogether. This is an
odd consequence of a provision designed to protect against searches
and seizures.6 8

Focusing exclusively on curbs and overrides, SOP studies on
the role of Congress in judicial review have operated within a
two-constraint paradigm. But end-runs-which are neither curbs
nor overrides-undoubtedly constrain (at least as a theoretical
matter) the exercise of judicial review by Justices assumed in the
judicial politics literature. In order to facilitate study of the constraining force of the end-run, the next Part incorporates the endrun into a formal theoretical model of judicial decisionmaking.
III. A REVISED MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

The judicial politics literature on Congress's role in judicial review remains inconclusive. This uncertain state can be attributed, in part, to its disregard of the congressional end-run. To
help incorporate the end-run into judicial politics this Part puts
forth a formal theoretical model of the end-run. The model demonstrates how prevailing SOP models systematically underestimate Congress's influence on the exercise of judicial review by
the Justices assumed in judicial politics studies.
A. OperativeAssumptions
Judicial politics models of decisionmaking share certain assumptions. First, every legal issue before the Court can be resolved along a spectrum of "decision-points." Second, Justices
seek to maximize broad platforms of individual policy preferences. Third, a given decision-point can have both direct and collateral effects on a policy platform. Based on these assumptions,
one realizes a general formula for a decision-point's "Expected
Net Impact" (from the perspective of the voting Justice):

68. 553 U.S. 164, 174 (2008).

2011]1

MODELING THE CONGRESSIONAL END-RUN

877

Expected Net Impact = Expected Direct Impact + Expected CollateralImpact
Because it is possible that a given decision of the Court will not
be fully implemented, "Expected Direct Impact" is best understood as the product of "Direct Impact of Implementation" (i.e., the
policy effects demanded from the face of the decision) and
"Chance of Decisional Implementation." Moreover, because not
every decision of the Court will trigger a collateral response, "Expected Collateral Impact" should be understood as the product of
"Impact of Collateral Response" and "Chance of Collateral Response." Our general formula for a decision-point's "Expected Net
Impact" can therefore be restated as follows:
Expected Net Impact = (DirectImpact of Implementation) (Chance of Implementation) + (Impact of
CollateralResponse) (Chance of CollateralResponse)
To illustrate this formula one can mark the various decisionpoints of judicial review along an X-coordinate. The 0-value
represents the status quo (i.e., upholding the legislation), and
each unit along the X-coordinate marks a decision-point of equal
deviation from the status quo. The Y-coordinate, on the other
hand, reflects the "Expected Net Impact" (measured in utils from
the perspective of the voting Justice) of a given decision-point (X).
Thus, one can restate the general formula for "Expected Net Impact" as follows:
Y = (DirectImpact of X's Implementation)(Chance of X's Implementation) + (Impact of CollateralResponse to X) (Chance of
CollateralResponse to X)
The following paragraphs utilize this general formula of "Expected Net Impact" to contrast the judicial behavior of the attitudinal and strategic Justices assumed by judicial politics scholars.
B. Attitudinal Utility
This subpart implements the general formula of "Expected Net
Impact" to illustrate the decisionmaking of attitudinal Justices.
The attitudinalist, remember, believes that Justices seek to maximize a broad platform of policy preferences and that they cast
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votes in a sincere manner. 69 In other words, the attitudinal Justice, when considering the costs and benefits of a particular decision-point, does not worry about Court majorities, exernal obstructions, or collateral responses. Returning to our general
formula of "Expected Net Impact" one can identify two key assumptions of the attitudinalist Justice:
Chance of X's Implementation = 1
Chance of CollateralResponse to X = 0
By incorporating these assumptions into our general formula, one
can restate the utility formula for an attitudinal Justice (Ya) as
follows:
Ya = (Direct Impact of X's Implementation) (1) + (Impact of CollateralResponse to X) (0)
This can be further restated as:
Ya = Direct Impact of X's Implementation
As an example, assume that an attitudinal Justice gains 10
utils of satisfaction for every 1-point positive deviation from the
policy status quo. Based on such assumption one realizes the
formula for this attitudinalist Justice's utility is:
Ya = 1oX

69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The attitudinal Justice is bothered by
neither external constraints nor internal constraints. Without care for internal constraints
(such as the need to build a majority coalition), the perceived impact of a decision-point
will not be discounted by such Justices on the grounds that it will not win the support of
the Court's majority.
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Figure 1 illustrates this utility formula:
Figure 1
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The assumption of gaining 10 utils per 1-point positive deviation is, of course, an arbitrary one. An attitudinal Justice could
just as well value the implementation of the status quo (i.e.,
upholding the reviewed legislation) above all things. If that were
the case, the attitudinalist's utility curve would look very different (as it would have, among other things, a negative slope).70
C. Strategic Utility
Unlike the attitudinalists, adherents to the strategic model
claim that Justices will deviate from their preferred decisionpoints to accommodate certain institutional constraints on their
ability to implement policy preferences. Because this article focuses on Congress's role in judicial review, our modeling of strategic behavior from this point forward will operate on the premise

70. The Y-value at the status quo could be framed as 0 or as some positive value. No
matter how it is framed, the slope will be negative.
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that voting Justices contemplate neither internal constraints
(such as building Court majorities) nor those external constraints
not emanating from Congress.7 '
As discussed in Part II, the prevailing SOP literature recognizes two congressional constraints on judicial review: curbs and
overrides.12 Put differently, the strategic Justice believes there
are some decision-points that will trigger a congressional limit on
the Court's authority (curb) and some decision-points which will
cause Congress to substitute its interpretation for that of the
Court (override). And so while the attitudinalist assumes that
"Chance of Collateral Response to X' is 0, and "Chance of Xs Implementation" is 1, both of these elements are variable for the
strategist. The following sections illustrate how the possibility of
congressional curbs and overrides impact the utility curve of the
strategic Justice assumed by judicial politics scholars.
1. Curbing Measures
The ensuing paragraphs seek to isolate how the congressional
curbing constraint affects a strategic Justice's utility curve. To do
so, it is helpful to assume a universe where congressional curbs
are the only available constraints on judicial review. Remember
the general formula for "Expected Net Impact":
Y = (DirectImpact of X's Implementation)(Chance of
X's Implementation) + (Impact of CollateralResponse
to X) (Chanceof CollateralResponse to X)
A congressional curbing measure is a formal limitation on the
Court's authority.73 It does not, however, obstruct the implementation of the triggering judicial decision. Therefore the "Chance of
Xs Implementation," in a curb-only universe, is fixed at 1. Because in the previous subpart it was established that "Direct Impact of Xs Implementation" is signified by Ya, the "Expected Direct Impact" of a decision (X), in a curb-only universe, is Ya. Yet
to measure a decision-point's "Expected Net Impact," its "Ex-

71. And so our assumed Justices contemplate neither internal constraints nor external constraints emanating from lower courts, the states, or the executive branch. This effectively means that any potential vote by the Justice will necessarily become the holding
of the Court (as there are no internal constraints on the Justice).
72. See supra Part II.B.
73. See supranotes 27-34 and accompanying text.
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pected Direct Impact" must be, of course, aggregated with its
"Expected Collateral Impact."
As discussed above, "Expected Collateral Impact" is the product
of "Impact of Collateral Response to X' and "Chance of Collateral
Response to X." A curb is a collateral response. Although curbs
come in various forms, any particular form of curb has, from a
Justice's perspective, a fixed impact. While "Impact of Collateral
Response" (signified in our model by C) is fixed in a curb-only universe, the "Chance of Collateral Response" (signified by Z) is variable.
This Z-value is a function of the Justices' decision-point (X): the
greater the deviation from the status quo, ceteris paribus, the
greater the Z-value (i.e., the more likely Congress will respond
with a curb). Thus, in a curb-only universe, the "Expected Collateral Impact" of a decision-point is the product of a fixed C and
variable Z. And so, the utility formula for a strategic Justice in a
curb-only universe (Yc) can be stated as follows:
Yc = (Ya)(1) + (C)(Z)

Because C represents the impact of a curb, and the impact of a
curb on a Justice's policy preferences is almost always a negative
one (i.e., a cost), C can be represented, for the sake of clarity, as a
negative integer.74 The formula for Yc can therefore be restated as
follows:
Yc = Ya - (C)(Z)

As a result, a strategic Justice (in a curb-only universe) will prefer a decision-point of X1 to X2 when:
[Ya, - (C)(Z,)] > [Yax - (C(Zx)]
And he will prefer a decision-point of X2 to X3 when:
[YaX2 - (C)(Zx)] > [Yaxa - ()(Zxa]
As mentioned above, the Z-value (i.e., the chance of a curb) is a
function of congressional preferences. Such preferences can be
represented along a curbing demand curve. Where the Xcoordinate represents decision-points of judicial review, and the
74. This is generally, though not always, a negative number. It could be positive, for
instance, if a Justice's platform was aligned with the legislature's preferences, and at odds
with the preferences of his colleagues on the Court. He would, under these circumstances,
just as soon have Congress curb the Court's authority in a certain policy area.
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Y-coordinate represents the chance of curb (Z), a curbing demand
curve will always be comprised of three general sections. In any
given instance of judicial review, one category of decision-points
will constitute sufficiently minor deviations from the status quo
such that there is zero chance of a resulting curb. For all such decision-points, Z equals 0.6 A second category of decision-points
may trigger a curb. For all such decision-points, Z is between 0
and 1. And a third category of decision-points, constituting sufficiently major deviations from the status quo, will trigger a curb.
For all such decision-points Z equals 1.76
So how does a strategic Justice measure Z? He does so by estimating the largest deviation from the status quo that cannot
trigger a curb (Zmin), and by estimating the smallest deviation
from the status quo that will necessarily trigger a curb (Zmax). Z
equals 0 at all deviations less than Zmin, and Z equals 1 at all
deviations larger than Zmax. For any deviation between Zmin
and Zmax, the Z-factor is calculated by dividing the difference between the given deviation and Zmin by the difference between
Zmax and Zmin.7 7 In other words, the "Chance of Collateral Response" in a curb-only universe for a decision-point (X) falling between Zmin and Zmax is as follows:
Z = [(X - Zmin) / (Zmax - Zmin)]
As an example, assume a Justice estimates Zmin at 4 and
Zmax at 6. Then the Z-factor of a decision-point of 5 would equal
0.5. The following graph, Figure 2, illustrates the congressional
demand for curbing based on these assumptions.

75. For these points: Yc = Ya. The strategic Justice's utility curve over these points
will perfectly track that of the attitudinal Justice.
76. For these points: Yc = Ya - C. The slope of the utility curve of the strategic Justice
over these points equals that of the attitudinalist Justice, yet the curves are separated by
a distance of C utils.
77. This assumes an even distribution of Z along the X-coordinate between the decision-points associated with Zmin and Zmax.
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Figure 2 illustrates the Z-factor. But Z, representing the
"Chance of Collateral Response" in a curb-only universe, is simply
one element in the formula to determine judicial utility in a curbonly universe (Yc). Let us return to our earlier formula:
Yc = Ya - (C)(Z)

Factoring in our existing assumptions (Ya = 1oX; Zmin = 4; Zmax
= 6) and making the additional assumption that the policy impact
of the curb is a loss of 28,78 we can draw the following conclusions
regarding judicial utility for a strategic Justice in a curb-only universe:
* When X= 2; then Ya = 20; C= 28; Z= 0; so Ye = 20.
* WhenX= 4; then Ya = 40; C= 28; Z= 0; so Yc = 40.
* WhenX= 5; then Ya = 50; C= 28; Z= .5; so Yc= 36.
* WhenX= 6; then Ya= 60; C= 28; Z= 1; so Yc= 42.
* When X = 10; then Ya = 100; C = 28; Z = 1; so Yc = 72.
78. This moreover assumes that Z is evenly distributed between the decision-points
associated with Zmin and Zmax.
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The graph below, Figure 3, contrasts the utility curve for a strategic Justice in a curb-only universe (Yc) with that of an attitudinal Justice (Ya).
Figure 3
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Note that the behavior of Justices, as predicted by the attitudinal
and the strategic model, are identical up to the decision-point
where there is a chance that Congress might respond with a curb
(Zmin). While the attitudinal Justice continues to gain utils with
each additional deviation from the status quo, the strategic Justice (in a curb-only universe) realizes that a vote of 4 is superior
to any vote between 4 and 6.8.
2. Overrides
Overrides obstruct the implementation of judicial decisions, but
they do not have any collateral impact on the Justice's platform of
policy preferences. 9 To examine how overrides impact the utility

79. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. This holds true at least in a single
game environment. But the dilution of prestige that can follow an override will, in an environment of repeat games, ultimately have a negative impact on the Justice's ability to
pursue preferred policies.
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of strategic Justices, let us return to the general formula for "Expected Net Impact":
Y = (DirectImpact of X's Implementation) (Chance of X's
Implementation) + (Impact of CollateralResponse to X)
(Chance of CollateralResponse to X)
Assuming a universe where congressional overrides are the only
available constraint on judicial review, "Chance of Collateral Response" (and thus, more generally, "Expected Collateral Impact")
will be fixed at 0. Yet to measure "Expected Net Impact" of a vote,
its "Expected Collateral Impact" must be aggregated with its
"Expected Direct Impact."
"Expected Direct Impact" is, of course, a product of "Direct Impact of Xs Implementation" and "Chance of Xs Implementation."
As discussed previously, "Direct Impact of X's Implementation" is
signified by Ya. The "Chance of Xs Implementation" in an override-only universe has a direct negative relationship with the
chance of an override. The likelihood of an override (N) is a function of the Justice's decision-point (X). The more deviation, ceteris
paribus, the more likely Congress will respond with an override.
The following formula represents utility for a strategic Justice in
an override-only universe (Yo):
Yo = (Ya)(1 - N)

Such a Justice will prefer a decision-point of X1 to X2 when:
(Yaxx)(1 - Nx

> (Yan)(1 - N )

And that same Justice will prefer a decision-point of X2 to X3
when:
(Ya)(l - N)

> (Yax,)(1 - N 3)

As mentioned above, the "Chance of Xs Implementation" in an
override-only world (1 - N) turns on congressional preferences.
Such preferences can be represented along a demand curve for
overrides. Where the X-coordinate represents decision-points, and
the Y-coordinate represents congressional demand for an override, the override demand curve (like the curbing curve) is comprised of three sections. In any given matter of judicial review,
there is one category of decision-points that constitutes a sufficiently minor deviation from the status quo such that there is no
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chance of an override. For all such points N equals 0.80 There is a
second category of decision-points where the chance of an override is between 0 and 1. In addition, there is a third category of
decision-points that constitutes such a sufficiently major deviation from the status quo that it is a certainty that Congress will
override. For all such points N equals 1.
So how does a strategic Justice measure 1? He does so by estimating the largest deviation from the status quo that cannot
trigger an override (Nmin), and by estimating the smallest deviation from the status quo that will necessarily trigger an override
(Nmax). N equals 0 at all deviations less than Nmin, and N
equals 1 at all deviations larger than Nmax. For any deviation
between Nmin and Nmax, the N-factor is calculated by dividing
the difference between the given deviation and Nmin by the difference between Nmax and Nmin.8 ' In other words, the "Chance
of Collateral Response" in a curb-only universe for a decisionpoint (X) falling between Nmin and Nmax is as follows:
N = [(X - Nmin) / (Nmax - Nmin)]

Conversely, the chances of avoiding an override (1 - N), for a decision-point (X) falling between Nmin and Nmax, is as follows:
1 - [(X - Nmin) / (Nmax - Nmin)]
If a Justice estimates Nmin at 6 and Nmax at 8, then the N associated with a decision-point of 6.1 would equal 0.05. The following graph, Figure 4, illustrates the congressional demand for
overrides based on these assumptions.

80. For these points: Yo = Ya. Thus, the strategic Justice's utility curve will, for these
points, perfectly track that of the attitudinalist Justice.
81. This assumes an even distribution of N along the X-coordinate between the decision-points associated with Nmin and Nmax.
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Figure 4
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To determine the "Chance of Xs Implementation" in an overrideonly universe, one must take a further step and evaluate the
chance of avoiding an override (1 - N). In our illustration, a decision-point of 6.1 results in a 0.05 chance of an override and, thus,
a 0.95 "Chance of Xs Implementation."
Let us return to our formula for judicial utility in an overrideonly universe:
Yo = Ya(l - N)

Faced with our previous assumptions (Ya = 1oX; Nmin = 6; Nmax
= 8), we can draw the following conclusions regarding judicial
utility for a strategic Justice in an override-only universe:
* WhenX= 2; then Ya= 20; N= 0; so Yo

20.

* When X= 4; then Ya = 40; N= 0; so Yo = 40.
* When X= 5; then Ya = 50; N= 0; so Yo = 50.
* WhenX= 6; then Ya= 60; N= 0; so Yo= 60.
* When X= 6.1; then Ya = 61; N= .05; so Yo = 57.95.
* When X= 7; then Ya = 70; N= .5; so Yo = 35.
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* When X= 7.8; then Ya = 78; N= .9; so Yo = 7.8.
* WhenX= 8; then Ya= 80; N= 1; so Yo= 0.
* When X= 10; then Ya = 100; N= 1; so Yo = 0.
The graph below, Figure 5, demonstrates how the utility curve for
a strategic Justice in an override-only universe (Yo) deviates from
the utility curve of an attitudinal Justice (Ya).
Figure 5

This illustrates that the optimal vote for an attitudinal Justice,
based on our assumptions, is 10 (or higher), whereas the optimal
vote for the strategic Justice (in an override-only universe) is 6.
3. The Traditional SOP Model
Of course, Justices do not operate in curb-only or override-only
universes. After addressing each of the two traditional constraints in isolation, it is necessary to measure the utility for a
strategic Justice in the "traditional" two-constraint paradigm
(i.e., faced with the possibility of both curbs and overrides). To
analyze utility in this traditional SOP model we begin, like before, with our general formula of "Expected Net Impact":
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Y = (Direct Impact of X's Implementation) (Chance of X's
Implementation) + (Impact of CollateralResponse to X)
(Chance of CollateralResponse to X)
In the traditional SOP model, the "Direct Impact of Xs Implementation" continues to be signified as Ya (for the reasons explained in the curbing and override sections). Remember that in
the curb-only universe the "Chance of Xs Implementation" is 1,
and that in the override-only universe it is 1 - N. Because these
factors modify the same element (Ya),82 the "Chance of Xs Implementation" in a traditional SOP model is a product of the
"Chances of Xs Implementation" from the curb- and override-only
universes. And so "Expected Direct Impact" in a traditional SOP
model equals (Ya)(1)(1 - N).
We now turn to examine "Expected Collateral Impact." In the
curb-only universe the "Impact of Collateral Response" is fixed at
C, and in an override-only universe it is 0. In the curb-only universe "Chance of Collateral Impact" is the variable Z, and in the
override-only universe it is 0. Because each of these "chance" variables modifies a different element (a curb and an override), the
"Expected Collateral Impact" for the traditional model is equal to
the aggregate of the two base products ((C*Z) + (0*0)) rather than
the product of all the elements (C*0*Z*O). Therefore, "Expected
Collateral Impact" in a traditional SOP model equals the product
of C and Z.
The utility formula for a strategic Justice in a traditional SOP
model (Yi) can be stated as:
Yi = Ya(1)(1 - N) + (C)(Z)

Taking into account that C has a negative value,83 one can restate
the formula as:
Yi = Ya(1 - N) - (C)(Z)

And so a Justice in a traditional SOP model will prefer a decisionpoint of X1 to X2 when:
[(Yax,)(1 - Nx1 ) - (C*Zx )] > [(Ya,)(1 - N 2) - (C*Zx)]
82. A particular decision, for instance, will not be of double value to a Justice simply
because it avoids two distinct constraints on its implementation. Moreover, the fact that
the decision avoids any one constraint on its implementation does not salvage any of its
value when its implementation is obstructed by a separate constraint.
83. See supranote 76 and accompanying text.
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And that same Justice will prefer a decision-point of X2 to X3
when:
[(YaX)(1 - NX) - (C*Zx)] > [(Yal)(1 - Nx3 )

-

(C*Zx 3 )]

With these formulae in mind, one can begin to realize the utility curve for a strategic Justice in a traditional SOP model. Factoring in our previous assumptions (Ya = 1OX; C = 28; Zmin = 4;
Zmax = 6; Nmin = 6; Nmax = 8) one can draw the following con-

clusions:
* When X= 2; then Ya = 20; C= 28; Z= 0; N= 0; so Yi = 20.
* WhenX= 4; then Ya = 40; C= 28; Z= 0; N= 0; so Yi = 40.
* WhenX= 5; then Ya= 50; C= 28; Z

.5; N= 0; so Yi= 36.

* When X= 6; then Ya= 60; C= 28; Z= 1; N= 0; so Yi
* When X = 6.1; then Ya= 61; C
29.95.

=

32.

28; Z = 1; N = .05; so Yi =

* When X= 7; then Ya= 70; C= 28; Z= 1; N= .5; so Yi= 7.
* When X= 7.8; then Ya = 78; C= 28; Z= 1; N= .9; so Yi=
-20.2.
* When X= 8; then Ya = 80; C = 28; Z = 1; N= 1; so Yi = -28.
* WhenX= 10; then Ya= 100; C= 28; Z= 1; N= 1; so Yi= -28.
The graph below, Figure 6, demonstrates how the utility curve for
a strategic Justice in a traditional SOP model (Yi) deviates from
the utility curves of an attitudinal Justice (Ya), a strategic Justice
in a curb-only universe (Yc), and a strategic Justice in an override-only (Yo) universe.
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Figure 6 illustrates that, based on our given assumptions, the optimal vote for an attitudinal Justice is 10 (or higher), and the optimal vote for a Justice in a traditional SOP model is 4.
D. Revising the TraditionalSOP Model
The previous subparts have illustrated how the exercise of
judicial review by the Justices assumed in the judicial politics literature is constrained by congressional curbing and override
measures. This article's objective, however, is to demonstrate the
incompleteness of the prevailing SOP models. The following paragraphs seek to illustrate the magnitude of this oversight.
1. The Funding End-Run
End-runs are congressional efforts to mitigate the costs of adverse judicial review by neither curbing nor overriding, but by a
different decision that cannot be invalidated, as a practical if not
legal matter, by the Court. End-runs come in various forms, in-
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cluding decisions to adjust appropriations, amend contingent
rules, reorient the bases for invalidated legislation in alternate
constitutional clauses, or modify grants of authority to the executive branch.84 To demonstrate the constraining role of the endrun, the following paragraphs hone in on the first of the identified
forms of the end-run: Congress's power to adjust appropriations.
To isolate the unique constraining role of this "funding" end-run,
we assume a universe where the only available constraint is Congress's ability to adjust appropriations.
We begin our analysis of the funding end-run with the general
formula for judicial utility:
Y = (DirectImpact of X's Implementation) (Chance of
X's Implementation) + (Impact of CollateralResponse
to X) (Chance of CollateralResponse to X)
As discussed in the previous subparts, "Direct Impact of Xs Implementation" is signified as Ya. The "Chance of Xs Implementation" in a strategic model with only funding end-runs has a direct
negative relationship to the chance of a congressional reappropriation (R). The R-value is variable and is a function of the Justice's
decision-point (X): The more deviation, all things being equal, the
more likely Congress will repeal the level of appropriations for related programs. 5 So in a world where the only congressional constraint is a funding end-run, the "Expected Direct Impact" of X is
the product of Ya and the chance of avoiding a reappropriation (1
-R).6

Turning to the "Expected Collateral Impact" element, "Impact
of Collateral Response" comes in the form of lost public programs
favored by the Justice. This policy cost is fixed at L.87 Moreover,
the "Chance of Collateral Response" is a variable represented by

84. See supra Part II.C.
85. As an illustration, assume a Court ruling that requires notice and a hearing before
the revocation of a new strain of unemployment benefits. For the Justice assumed by the
judicial politics scholar, see PICKERILL, supra note 4, a congressional decision to defund the
related program is a de facto obstruction of the implementation of the Court's decision.
86. This assumes an "all-or-nothing" approach where the program is fully utilized until the moment it is completely repealed. If R equals 0.5, this means that half of the time
the program will be completely repealed and half of the time it will be let alone. Note that
it does not mean that Congress will repeal half of its funding. It also assumes that the
Court is focusing on only this program and not other future programs which the Justice
might value differently.
87. See supra note 86.
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R.88 So in a universe where the only available constraint is a funding end-run, the "Expected Collateral Impact" is simply the product of L and R.
The following formula represents the utility for a strategic Justice in a universe with only the funding form of end-run constraints (Yef):
Yef = Ya(1 - R) + (L)(R)

Because L has a negative value for the Justice, 9 the formula for
Yef can be restated as follows:
Yef = Ya(1 - R) - (L)(R)

A Justice in a universe with only funding end-run constraints will
prefer a decision-point of X1 to X2 when:
[(Yax) (1 - Rx) - (L)(Rx,)] > [(Yan)(l - R2) - (L)(RX2)]

That same Justice will prefer a decision-point of X2 to X3 when:
[(YaX2 )(1 - RX)

-

(L)(Rxj] > [(Yax,) (1 - RX3 ) - (L)(Rxs)]

The basis of the formula to determine the R-value should be
familiar by now. The congressional demand curve for reappropriations, like those for curbs and overrides, is comprised of three
sections. For one class of decision-points (those at or below Rmin),
R will equal 0.9o For another (those at or above Rmax) R will
equal 1.91 Yet there will be a third class of decision-points (those
between Rmin and Rmax) where the chance of reappropriation
falls between 0 and 1. For decision-points in this class, the Rvalue can be measured by dividing the difference between X and
Rmin by the difference between Rmax and Rmin:

88. Note that with a funding end-run-unlike a curb or an override-the chance of its
execution (R) affects both the "Expected Direct Impact" and "Expected Collateral Impact"
of a decision-point. The funding end-run obstructs decisional implementation (i.e., the ruling is obstructed for there is no program left to be regulated) and it leads to collateral consequences coming in the form of the lost social program. The dual impact of funding endruns differs from curbs (which operate exclusively through collateral policies) and overrides (which operate exclusively through obstructing decisional implementation).
89. The end-run's collateral impact is subtracted when such impact is negative. If the
end-run were expected to cause a collateral gain (a rare circumstance) then one would, of
course, add the impact to the base formula. See generally supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
90. For these points: Yfe = Ya. The utility curve of the strategic Justice will, over
these points, perfectly track that of the attitudinal Justice.
91. For these points: Yfe = -L.
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X,,,)]

If one assumes that a Justice estimates Rmin at 3 and Rmax at 7,
then the R-value of a decision-point of 3.5 equals 0.125. The following graph, Figure 7, illustrates the congressional demand for
reappropriation.
Figure 7
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To determine the "Chance of Xs Implementation" in a universe
with only funding end-run constraints, one must take the further
step to evaluate the chance of avoiding such an end-run (1 - R).
In our illustration, a decision-point of 6.1 leads to a 0.125 chance
of appropriation and, thus, a 0.875 "Chance of Xs Implementation."
To illustrate the utility of a strategic Justice in a universe with
only funding end-runs (Yef), we should return to our formula for
Yef:
Yef = Ya(1 - R) - (L)(R)
Taking our previous assumptions (Ya = 1OX; Rmin = 3; Rmax =

7), and adding the assumption that L = 12, we can draw the following conclusions regarding judicial utility:
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* WhenX= 2; then Ya= 20; L= 12; R= 0; so Yef = 20.
* When X= 3; then Ya = 30; L = 12; R = 0; so Yef = 30.
* When X= 3.5; then Ya = 35; L = 12; R = .125; so Yef = 29.125.
* When X= 6; then Ya = 70; L = 12; R= .75; so Yef = 6.
* WhenX= 7; then Ya= 70; L= 12; R= 1; so Yef = -12.
* When X= 10; then Ya = 100; L = 12; R = 0; so Yef = -12.
The graph below, Figure 8, demonstrates how the utility curve for
a strategic Justice in a universe with only funding end-run constraints (Yet) deviates from the utility curve of an attitudinal Justice (Ya).
Figure 8
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Figure 8 illustrates that the optimal vote is 10 (or higher) for an
attitudinal Justice, but only 3 for a strategic Justice in a universe
with only funding end-runs.
Upon analyzing the funding form of the end-run in isolation,
we now turn to incorporate it into the traditional SOP model set
forth in the previous subpart. To do so, we begin by returning to
the utility formula for Justices in the traditional SOP model (Yi):
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Yi = (Ya)(1 - N) - (C)(Z)

To integrate the formula for the traditional SOP model (Yi) with
that for the end-run (Yef), one must multiply the "Expected Direct
Impact" component of the traditional SOP formula ((Ya)(1 - N))
by the chance of avoiding an end-run (1 - R). 92 One then subtracts
from the entire equation the product of the end-run's "Policy Impact of Collateral Response" and "Chance of Collateral Response"
((L)(R)). The formula for judicial utility in this revised SOP model
(Yr) can be stated as follows:
Yr = (Ya) (1 - N) (1 - R) - (C) (Z) - (L) (R)

Factoring in our previous assumptions that Ya = lOX; Nmin = 6;
Nmax = 8; Zmin = 4; Zmax = 6; Rmin = 3; Rmax = 7; C = 28; and
L = 12, we can draw the following conclusions about judicial utility:
*When X = 4, Ya = 40; N = 0; R =.25; C

28; Z = 0; L = 12; so

Yr = 27.

*WhenX= 5, Ya= 50; N= 0; R= .5; C= 28; Z=.5; L= 12; so
Yr = 5.

*WhenX=6,Ya=60;N=0;R=.75;C=28;Z=1;L=12;so
Yr = -22.

*When X = 7, Ya = 70; N =.5; R = 1; C=28; Z = 1; L = 12; so
Yr = -40.

*WhenX=10,Ya=100;N=1;R=1;C=28;Z=1;L=12;so
Yr = -40.

The graph below, Figure 9, demonstrates how judicial behavior
for a strategic Justice deviates when congressional end-runs are
contemplated. Yi represents the utility curve for a Justice in a
traditional SOP model (that ignores end-runs), whereas Yr
represents the utility curve for a Justice in a "revised" SOP model
that contemplates the possibility of end-runs.

92. For a discussion of why the integration process requires "multiplication"to figure
the "Expected Direct Impact" and "subtraction"for "Expected Collateral Impact," see supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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This figure shows that, based on the above assumptions, the optimal vote is 10 (or higher) for the attitudinal Justice, 4 for the
strategic Justice in a traditional SOP model, and 3 for a Justice
in the revised SOP model. Importantly, this demonstrates how
the end-run constraint shifts the utility curve of the Justices assumed in the judicial politics literature.
2. Incorporating Additional Forms of End-Runs
The previous discussion analyzed the impact of only one type of
end-run (the adjustment of appropriations). There are, of course,
additional forms of the end-run. And each form, as it turns out,
can be easily incorporated into our revised SOP model.
To reconsider the unique constraining effect of a particular
form of the end-run constraint on judicial utility, one should
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make two amendments to any base SOP formula for judicial utility.93 First, one should multiply the "Expected Direct Impact" element of the base formula by the chance that the decision-point
will avoid triggering the new form of end-run (which is, in turn, a
function of Congress's demand for that end-run).9 4 Second, one
should subtract from the entire base formula the product of the
collateral policy lost by the implemented end-run and the chance
of the end-run's implementation.15
For example, we can analyze the unique constraining role of
the congressional end-run of "amending a contingent rule" in relation to the revised SOP model set forth in the previous subsection (Yr). Assume that this "contingent rule" form of end-run has
a collateral cost of J and a chance of W Amending the base formula of Yr, we see that a strategic Justice in a universe where
this new "contingent" end-run is also available (Yr*) can be stated
as follows:
Yr* = (Ya)(1 - N)(1 - R)(1 -

9 - (C)(Z) - (L)(R) - (J)(W)

As a further example, consider the end-run coming in the form of
"reorienting the constitutional bases of invalidated legislation in
an alternate constitutional clause." Assume that this form of endrun has a collateral impact of 0 and a chance of P.96 The utility of
a strategic Justice in a universe with all three types of end-runs
(Yr**) can be expressed as follows:
Yr** = (Ya)(1 - N)(1 - R)(1 - W)(1 - P) - (C*Z) - (L*R) - (J*)
- (P*O)

93. By "base" I mean the formula for the model encompassing the constraints against
which you seek to evaluate the constraining role of the end-run. Note that with most (but
not all) forms of end-runs, the chance of its execution affects both the "Expected Direct
Impact" and "Expected Collateral Impact" of a decision-point. Most forms have the possibility to obstruct decisional implementation and create collateral consequences. See supra
note 88.
94. See supra note 91 on why it is proper to calculate the product of (rather than the
difference between) the base formula and the chance that the end-run will not disrupt decisional implementation.
95. See generally supra note 92.
96. One can assume expected collateral costs of 0 with this form of end-run because
Congress will, in response, do no more than seek to simply resurrect its lost policy. If there
were a risk that Congress would, in response, seek to advance a more robust form of the
policy offensive to the voting Justice, then expected collateral costs would, of course, exist.
Collateral costs seem unlikely for, were Congress interested in a more robust form of policy offensive to the Justice, it would have advanced such a policy in its initial legislative
effort.
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Factoring in our previous assumptions (Ya = 1OX; Nmin = 6;
Nmax = 8; Zmin = 4; Zmax = 6; Rmin = 3; Rmax = 7; C = 28; L =

12), and adding further assumptions (Wmin = 2; Wmax = 9; Pmin
= 7; Pmax = 8; J = 4), one draws the following conclusions regard-

ing judicial utility:
* When X= 4, Ya = 40; N= 0; R= .25; W
= 0; L = 12; J= 4; so Yr** = 17.29.

.29; P= 0; C = 28; Z

* When X= 5, Ya = 50; N= 0; R =.5; W=.43; P= 0; C= 28; Z=
.5; L = 12; J

4; so Yr** = -7.42.

* When X 6, Ya= 60; N= 0; R .75; W=.57; P= 0; C= 28; Z
=1;L =12;J =4;so Yr**=-32.86.
* WhenX= 7, Ya= 70; N=.5; R 1; W=.71; P= 0; C= 28; Z=
1; L = 12; J = 4; so Yr** = -42.86.

* WhenX= 10, Ya= 100; N= 1; R= 1; W= 1; P= 1; C= 28; Z=
1; L = 12; J= 4; so Yr** = -44.

The graph below, Figure 10, demonstrates how the utility curve
for a strategic Justice in an SOP model with multiple end-runs
(Yr**) deviates from the utility curve of a Justice in a traditional
SOP model (Yi), and the utility curve of a Justice in a traditional
SOP model that includes only the funding end-run (Yr).
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Figure 10
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This demonstrates how a Justice's contemplation of each new
end-run presents the possibility of a unique shift in the strategic
Justice's utility curve.
IV. CONCLUSION

The judicial politics literature on the role of Congress in judicial review remains inconclusive. This protracted state of uncertainty might ultimately be explained by the literature's undue
dependence on a two-constraint paradigm. For five decades judicial politics scholars have confined their analyses to two types of
congressional constraints on judicial review. But by examining
recent developments in constitutional theory, one can infer a new,
heretofore ignored constraint on judicial review. This constraint
is the congressional end-run.
End-runs occur where Congress seeks to mitigate the policy
implications of adverse judicial review by neither formally limiting the Court's authority nor by substituting its preferred inter-
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pretation for that of the Court, but through a different decision
which cannot, as a practical if not legal matter, be invalidated by
the Court. Examples of the congressional end-run include decisions to modify grants of authority to the executive branch, adjust
appropriations, amend contingent rules, or reorient the bases for
legislation in an alternate constitutional clause. The strategic
Justices assumed by judicial politics scholars will at some points
compromise their exercise of judicial review to avoid triggering
end-runs damaging to their overall policy agenda.
This article puts forth a formal theoretical model of the endrun. This model reveals that the traditional SOP models (which
have worked within the two-constraint paradigm) have systematically underestimated the degree to which their assumed Justices
are constrained by Congress. Judicial politics scholars should
amend their formal models and redesign their empirical studies
to account for the constraining effect of the congressional endrun. This reorientation will likely give political scientists a fuller
understanding of the interactions between Congress and the Supreme Court.
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